

Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors



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This activity is supported by **Novartis, Name Creation and Regulatory Strategy.**

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Objectives

1. Define the term high-alert medication as it related to community/ambulatory pharmacy practice.
2. Recall commonly used medications considered high alert in the community/ambulatory setting.
3. Discuss the types of events and contributing factors associated with errors involving vaccines, including those for COVID-19.
4. Discuss the adoption of proven prevention strategies designed to prevent or identify medication and vaccine errors in the community/ambulatory pharmacy setting before they reach a patient.



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What is a High-Alert Medication?

- Small number of medications that have a high risk of causing injury if misused.
- Errors may or may not be more common with these than with other medications, but the consequences of errors may be devastating.



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High-Alert Medications



Specific Medications

Car**BAM**azepine

EPINEPHrine, IM, subcutaneous

Insulin U-500 (special emphasis)*

Lamo**TRI**gine

Methotrexate, oral and parenteral, nononcologic use (special emphasis)*

Phenytoin

Valproic acid

*All oral and parenteral chemotherapy, and all insulins are considered high-alert medications. These specific medications have been singled out for special emphasis to bring attention to the need for distinct strategies to prevent the types of errors that occur with these medications.

Classes/Categories of Medications

Antithrombotic agents, oral and parenteral, including:

- Anticoagulants (e.g., warfarin, low molecular weight heparin, unfractionated heparin)
- Direct oral anticoagulants and factor Xa inhibitors (e.g., dabigatran, rivaroxaban, apixaban, edoxaban)
- Direct thrombin inhibitors (e.g., dabigatran)

Chemotherapeutic agents

- Oral and parenteral chemotherapy (e.g., capecitabine, cyclophosphamide)
- Oral targeted therapy and immunotherapy (e.g., Palbociclib [**IBRANCE**], imatinib [**GLEEVEC**], bosutinib [**BOSULIF**])
- Excludes hormonal therapy

Immunosuppressant agents, oral and parenteral (e.g., aza**THIO**prine, cyclo**SPORINE**, tacrolimus)

Insulins, all formulations and strengths (e.g., U-100, U-200, U-300, U-500)

Medications contraindicated during pregnancy (e.g., bosentan, **ISO**tretinoin)

Moderate and minimal sedation agents, oral, for children (e.g., chloral hydrate, midazolam, ketamine [using the parenteral form])

Opioids, all routes of administration (e.g. oral, sublingual, parenteral, transdermal), including liquid concentrates, immediate- and sustained-release formulations, and combination products with another drug

Pediatric liquid medications that require measurement

Sulfonylurea hypoglycemics, oral (e.g., chlorpro**PAMIDE**, glimepiride, gly**BURIDE**, glipiz**IDE**, **TOLBUT**amide)



<https://www.ismp.org/recommendations/high-alert-medications-community-ambulatory-list>

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Deaths Associated with Medications Occurring Outside Healthcare Facilities

— The most frequent medications identified during analysis of the severe harm or death events included:

- methadone
- HYDROmorphone
- methotrexate
- fentanyl
- insulin



ISMP Canada. Medications Most Frequently Reported in Harm Incidents over the Past 5 Years (2015–2020).
<https://www.ismp-canada.org/download/safetyBulletins/2020/ISMPCSB2020-i11-Medications-Reported-Harm.pdf>

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Emergency Hospitalization for ADEs



Table 4. National Estimates of Medications Commonly Implicated in Emergency Hospitalizations for Adverse Drug Events in Older U.S. Adults, 2007–2009.^a

Medication	Annual National Estimate of Hospitalizations (N=99,628)		Proportion of Emergency Department Visits Resulting in Hospitalization
	no.	% (95% CI)	%
Most commonly implicated medications†			
Warfarin	33,171	33.3 (28.0–38.5)	46.2
Insulins	13,854	13.9 (9.8–18.0)	40.6
Oral antiplatelet agents	13,263‡	13.3 (7.5–19.1)	41.5
Oral hypoglycemic agents	12,856	10.7 (8.1–13.3)	51.8
Opioid analgesics	4,778	4.8 (3.5–6.1)	32.4
Antibiotics	4,205	4.2 (2.9–5.5)	18.3
Digoxin	3,465	3.5 (1.9–5.0)	80.5
Antineoplastic agents	3,329‡	3.3 (0.9–5.8)‡	51.5
Antidiuretic agents	2,899	2.9 (2.1–3.7)	35.7
Renin-angiotensin inhibitors	2,870	2.9 (1.7–4.1)	32.6
Sedative or hypnotic agents	2,469	2.5 (1.6–3.3)	35.2
Anticonvulsants	1,653	1.7 (0.9–2.4)	40.0
Diuretics	1,071‡	1.1 (0.4–1.8)‡	42.4
High-risk or potentially inappropriate medications§			
HEDIS high-risk medications	1,207	1.2 (0.7–1.7)	20.7
Beers-criteria potentially inappropriate medications	6,607	6.6 (4.4–8.9)	42.0
Beers-criteria potentially inappropriate medications, excluding digoxin	3,170	3.2 (2.3–4.1)	27.6



Budnitz et al. Emergency Hospitalizations for Adverse Drug Events in Older Americans. N Engl J Med 2011; 365:2002-2012

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Anticoagulants

Warfarin
Heparin
Enoxaparin
DOACs

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Warfarin - Problems

Dosing Errors

- Directions are confusing (alternate day dosing)
- Changes in directions via telephone can cause confusion for some patients
- Multiple warfarin products with different names



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Anticoagulant Problems

- Failure to verify labs (e.g., INR)
- Food, drug, herbal interactions overlooked
- Concomitant use of anticoagulants
 - Warfarin and DOACs
 - Multiple DOACs



ISMP. Duplicate oral anticoagulants. ISMP Medication Safety Alert!
Community/Ambulatory edition. March 2018 Vol 17, No 3. 1

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DOAC - Problems

- Unnecessary bridging when starting a DOAC
- Concomitant use of warfarin with a DOAC
- Use of more than one DOAC
- Confusion between starting and maintenance dosing



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Insulin

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Insulin Problems in Pharmacy

- Multitude of insulin products
 - Similar packaging/labeling
 - Storage conditions
- Patient information
 - Blood glucose levels
 - A1C
 - Other medications



ISMP. Complexity of insulin therapy has risen sharply in the past decade. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Jan 2004 Vol 3, No 1, 1.

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Lack of Patient Education with Insulin?

- Differentiating insulin types by touch and separate storage
- Changing concentrations of insulin
 - E.g., from 100 units/mL to 300 units/mL
 - Change in dosing interval in pen
- Sharing insulin pens

ISMP. Differentiating insulin types by touch and separate storage. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Nov 2017 Vol 16, No 11. 2.
ISMP. Misuse of new insulin strengths. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Sept 2016 Vol 16, No 9. 3.
ISMP. Insulin pens should not be shared between patients!. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Jan 2012 Vol 11, No 1. 1.
ISMP. Tresiba U-200 won't allow dosing an odd number of insulin units. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Jan 2017 Vol 16, No 1. 1.




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
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Insulin Pen Needles

Safety Pen Needle



Standard Pen Needle



ISMP. Alert! Severe hyperglycemia in patients incorrectly using insulin pens at home. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Oct 2017 Vol 16, No 10. 1.

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Patient Education

[illegible]

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Methotrexate

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Methotrexate Error Case #1

- A pediatric patient was prescribed weekly dose (3 tablets of 2.5 mg twice daily on Thursdays) for psoriasis
 - Patient's mother did not understand
 - Instead gave 3 tablets of 2.5mg twice daily for a week
- The patient was hospitalized due to methotrexate toxicity



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Best Practice 2

- a) Use a weekly dosage regimen default for oral methotrexate in electronic systems when medication orders are entered.

Issue: Oral methotrexate for non-oncological indications administered daily, instead of weekly

!! METHotrexate should usually be administered once weekly (unless indication is cancer chemotherapy). You are signing an order with a frequency OTHER THAN weekly. Please make sure this frequency is appropriate. (Alert # 1775)



ISMP. 2020-2021 ISMP Targeted Medication Safety Best Practices for Hospitals.
<https://www.ismp.org/guidelines/best-practices-hospitals>

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Best Practice 2

- b) Require a hard stop verification of an appropriate oncologic indication for all daily oral methotrexate orders
 - For manual systems and electronic order entry systems that cannot provide a hard stop, clarify all daily orders for oral methotrexate if the patient does not have a documented oncologic diagnosis
 - Work with their software vendors and information technology departments

ISMP. Persistent safety hazards that all community and ambulatory care safety programs should address. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. May 2021 Vol 20, No 5, 1.



ISMP. 2020-2021 ISMP Targeted Medication Safety Best Practices for Hospitals.
<https://www.ismp.org/guidelines/best-practices-hospitals>

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Best Practice 2

- c) Provide specific patient and/or family education for all oral methotrexate discharge orders
 - Double-check all printed medication lists and discharge instructions to ensure that they indicate the correct dosage regimen prior to providing them to the patient



<https://consumermedsafety.org/medication-safety-articles/item/847-teaching-sheets>
ISMP. 2020-2021 ISMP Targeted Medication Safety Best Practices for Hospitals.
<https://www.ismp.org/guidelines/best-practices-hospitals>

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Opioids

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Causes for Adverse Drug Events with Opioids

- Improper prescribing, not caught by pharmacy
 - Multiple opioids, with multiple doses, via multiple routes, long-acting opioids
- Failure to consider patient comorbidities and current opioid use
- Lack of knowledge about equianalgesic potency among opioids
- Studies found that a total of 20.7% of all respondents reported having shared opioid medications with another person
 - Among those who had leftover opioids, 61.3% reported keeping them for future use



Kennedy-Hendricks A, Gielen A, McDonald E, et al. Medication sharing, storage, and disposal practices for opioid medications among US adults. JAMA Intern Med. 2016. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.2543

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Opioid Naïve vs. Tolerant

- Opioid Naïve
 - Patients who do not meet the definition of opioid tolerant
- Opioid Tolerance¹
 - Patients who have been receiving DAILY, for one week or longer, at least one of the following:
 - 60 mg morphine – 30 mg oral oxycodone – 8 mg HYDROmorphine



1- Food and Drug Administration.
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2008/019813s033lbl.pdf

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Fentanyl Patch Problems

- Inappropriate patient selection
- Improper disposal of patches
- Patient confusion about proper application
 - Removing old patches
- Awareness about a patch
 - Patients may not mention that they wear a patch
 - Patches are clear or translucent



ISMP Medication Safety Alert! 2005;4(8)

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Problem

- FentaNYL patches (and long-acting opioids) have been inappropriately prescribed:
 - For opioid-naïve patients to treat acute pain.
- FentaNYL patches (and long-acting opioids) should only be used in opioid-tolerant patients for management of pain severe enough to around-the-clock, long-term opioid treatment.



ISMP. Inappropriate fentaNYL patch prescriptions for opioid-naïve, elderly patients. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. Aug 2020 Vol 19, No 8. 1.

ISMP. Persistent safety hazards that all community and ambulatory care safety programs should address. ISMP Medication Safety Alert! Community/Ambulatory edition. May 2021 Vol 20, No 5. 1.

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Best Practice 15 [New]

- Verify and document a patient's opioid status (naïve versus tolerant) and type of pain (acute versus chronic) before prescribing and dispensing extended-release and long-acting opioids

** Issue: Inappropriate use of opioids which can lead to patient harm and death.*



ISMP. 2020-2021 ISMP Targeted Medication Safety Best Practices for Hospitals.
<https://www.ismp.org/guidelines/best-practices-hospitals>

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Goals for Best Practice 15

- Support appropriate prescribing and dispensing of extended-release and long-acting opioid medications
- Prevent the inappropriate use of fentaNYL patches to treat acute pain in patients who are opioid-naïve



<https://consumermedsafety.org/medication-safety-articles/item/847-teaching-sheets>
ISMP. 2020-2021 ISMP Targeted Medication Safety Best Practices for Hospitals.
<https://www.ismp.org/guidelines/best-practices-hospitals>



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Strategies

- High-Alert Medication List...only effective when combined with risk-reduction strategies
- Implement Risk-Reduction Strategies
 - Understand the causes of errors
 - Layer comprehensive strategies
- Communicate the List and Strategies
- Assess the Effectiveness of Strategies

MG2



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MG2

A few specific strategies from self assessment if you want to mention while talking: 1) Systems used for clinical management and/or pharmacy dispensing systems incorporate prompts for selected medications, including specialty and HIGH-ALERT MEDICATIONS, to obtain, review, and verify critical patient information (e.g., allergies and reactions, weight, laboratory values, opioid tolerance for patients receiving long-acting opioids, indication for drug) necessary to confirm the appropriateness of the medication, dose, dosage form, and directions for use. 2) Criteria have been established for selected HIGH-ALERT MEDICATIONS (e.g., fentaNYL patch, methotrexate, insulin, opioids) or high-risk patient populations to trigger required medication counseling, and a system is in place to alert the pharmacist of this need when the patient picks up the prescription (e.g., bold alert on the bag, pharmacy computer-system alert). 3) Electronic HARD STOPS are in place at the point of sale to restrict completion of the sale until patient education has occurred for selected HIGH-ALERT MEDICATIONS or high-risk patient populations. Scoring Guideline: Choose Not Applicable if your pharmacy is a closed-door pharmacy.

Michael Gaunt, 10/21/2021

Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Specific Strategies

- Incorporate prompts to obtain, review, and verify critical patient information
 - e.g., allergies and reactions, weight, laboratory values, opioid tolerance for patients receiving long-acting opioids, indication for drug
- Criteria to trigger required medication counseling, and a system is in place to alert the pharmacist of this need when the patient picks up the prescription
 - e.g., bold alert on the bag, pharmacy computer-system alert
- Electronic hard stops are in place at the point of sale to restrict completion of the sale until patient education has



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Safety Considerations for Minimizing Vaccination-Related Errors

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ISMP Vaccine Error Reporting Program

- The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) partnered with the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) to develop a web-based VAE surveillance tool, the Vaccine Error Reporting Program (VERP)
- VERP collects data on VAEs, including type and description of error, implicated vaccine, and provider information
- VAEs are self-reported online at: <http://verp.ismp.org>.
- US providers notified of VERP by email in October of 2012, and the Immunization Action Coalition and ISMP notified subscribers via their newsletters in December 2012.
- De-identified reports are shared with FDA and CDC for entry into VAERS but do NOT replace mandatory reports for EUA vaccines



<https://www.ismp.org/report-medication-error>

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COVID-19 RESOURCES ABOUT CONTACT NEWS CHEERS
Information for consumers

Consulting and Education Tools and Resources Publications and Alerts **Error Reporting** LOGIN

Report an Error

Share your stories with ISMP and help prevent errors and patient harm

Healthcare practitioners and consumers report medication and vaccine errors to ISMP with the hope that future errors and patient harm will be prevented. We rely on the details you provide in your reports to identify the causes and contributing factors of the event. It is only with detailed information that we can tell a powerful story that can spark change and improvement.

We thank you for trusting us with your reports. You can expect ISMP staff to review every report received. We look forward to working together to prevent medication errors and patient harm.

I am reporting as a:

CONSUMER HEALTHCARE PRACTITIONER

ISMP
An ECRI Affiliate

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Report an Error

Share your stories with ISMP and help prevent errors and patient harm

Report an Error: Healthcare Practitioners

REPORT A MEDICATION ERROR

REPORT A VACCINE ERROR



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VERP REPORTING

Report Main PageReportsReporter Email List

You are logged in as: mcohen, Logout (Change password)

VACCINE ERROR REPORT DETAILS

Submission ID: 9859Submitted on: 6/17/2020Printed: No

Submitted as PSO: No

1. Submission Type: Error occurred and reached the patient

2. Event Date: 6/10/2020

3. Vaccines Involved:

Brand name	Generic name	Manufacturer	Dosage	Lot#	Exp. Date	NDC
Engerix-B	HepB (Hepatitis B Vaccine [Recombinant])	GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals				

4. Event Description: [Edit/De-identify]


Two patients with similar names were scheduled at similar times; one on Teamlet A (FP), one on PHN B (IZ). The IZ client called JCPH for check-in & registration over the phone with CSR staff. PHN was notified that client is ready to complete PHN portion of appointment and told to call client. PHN called correct IZ client and verified identity, gathered appointment information, and verified type of vaccine, administration location, possible side effects, and disease prevented by vaccination over the phone. PHN jabbered CSR and asked to have client roomed. CSR roomed an incorrect FP client with similar name in IZ clinic room. PHN entered room, reviewed possible vaccine reactions, client denied any questions, IZ administered. Client then informed the PHN that they are here for STI testing. PHN discussed vaccine error, immunization history with client; client verbalizes they are okay with vaccine error. Client is from out-of-state and has no records with him. Informed FP APRN of the situation. FP APRN completed FP visit and discussed vaccine history again with client. Client requests another vaccine which was administered same day by IZ PHN. Record request form filled to obtain out of state IZ records.

5. Age of patient at time of event: 31 years

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
Event Detail Questions



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Contributing Factors



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November 19, 2020 • Volume 25 Issue 23

Acute Care

ISMP Medication Safety Alert!

Educating the Healthcare Community About Safe Medication Practices

Learning from influenza vaccine errors to prepare for COVID-19 vaccination campaigns

Consumers have been responding to the advice of healthcare experts and getting influenza (flu) vaccinations in record numbers this year, which will help reduce the burden on the healthcare system due to the dual threat of the flu and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). While this is wonderful news, ISMP has also seen a corresponding increase in the frequency of reported flu vaccine-related errors. Since September 2020, ISMP has received more than 40 error reports associated with the 2020-2021 flu vaccine.

Analysis of the vaccine-related errors and other harmful or deadly vaccine errors from the past leads to concerns about the monumental COVID-19 vaccination campaigns that may start as early as next month and will run well into 2021 and beyond. It is evident that many underlying causes of flu vaccine-related errors could just as easily lead to errors associated with the new COVID-19 vaccines and the hundreds of millions of doses that will be given (billions globally). This means that it will be crucial for any healthcare provider who plans to stock and/or administer COVID-19 vaccines to learn from these prior vaccine-related errors, anticipate that similar errors could happen with the COVID-19 vaccines, and take the necessary steps to prepare their facilities and healthcare teams in order to mitigate the risk of vaccine-related errors. We hope that providing a description of the anticipated COVID-19 vaccines, along with the causal factors associated with the recent bout of flu vaccine-related errors and other previously reported harmful or fatal vaccine errors, will help healthcare providers anticipate the risks and prepare for one of the largest vaccination efforts in US history with the upcoming COVID-19 vaccination campaigns?

Anticipated COVID-19 Vaccines

It is anticipated that two mRNA messenger ribonucleic acid (COVID-19) vaccines from Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna, which are both in Phase 3 clinical trials, may receive Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as early as the end of this month.¹ Current resources suggest the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine (30 mg/0.3 mL, after dilution, multiple-dose vial) requires two doses to be administered 21 days apart, and the Moderna vaccine (100 mg/0.5 mL, multiple-dose vial) requires two doses to be administered 28 days apart. The vaccine storage temperatures are freezing (Moderna) or subzero (Pfizer-BioNTech); however, temporary storage under refrigeration is allowed for a limited time (5 days for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, 30 days for the Moderna vaccine). The Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine can be brought to room temperature and must be diluted prior to use and administered within 6 hours of dilution. The Moderna vaccine must be used within 12 hours after storage at room temperature or within 6 hours after the vial has been removed. The Pfizer-BioNTech (pfizer.com/covid19) and Moderna (moderna.com/covid19) vaccine labels are displayed on DataMaid and in Figure 1 (labels might change). All of the current COVID-19 vaccines in development will be administered intramuscularly (IM). Other COVID-19 vaccines will likely receive EUA approval in 2021. Some of these vaccines may need a diluent or an adjuvant provided in a separate vial that requires mixing.

Cautious Factors with Errors

Many of the underlying causative factors associated with the recent 2020-2021 flu vaccine errors and certain harmful or fatal vaccine errors in the past could also be factors that lead to errors with the new COVID-19 vaccines.

continued on page 2 — Vaccine errors >

January 14, 2021 • Volume 26 Issue 1

Acute Care

ISMP Medication Safety Alert!

Educating the Healthcare Community About Safe Medication Practices

Learning from errors with the new COVID-19 vaccines

PROBLEM: In mid-December, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted emergency use authorization (EUA) to both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines. Since then, ISMP has received numerous voluntary reports of COVID-19 vaccine errors or hazards through the ISMP National Vaccine Errors Reporting Program (NVERP), the ISMP National Consumer Medication Errors Reporting Program (NCMERP), and via email correspondence from professional colleagues. (See the last recommendation on page 8 regarding a mandatory requirement to report all COVID-19 vaccine errors and adverse reactions to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System [VAERS] at <https://vaers.hhs.gov>.) The following highlights a few of the mistakes happening across the nation and internationally, from vaccine dilution errors to look-alike product mix-ups. There is much to be gleaned from these reports, as the same types of errors are likely happening globally, and similar risks exist in most settings. We conclude with safe practice recommendations to help prevent these types of errors in your practice setting.

Dilution Errors

Four dilution errors were reported with the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine, which was granted EUA for immunization to prevent COVID-19 in individuals 16 years and older. After thawing, each Pfizer-BioNTech multiple-dose vaccine vial contains 0.45 mL, which must be diluted using 18 mL of preservative-free (0.9% sodium chloride) 0.9% sodium chloride injection. Once properly diluted, each vial contains 6, perhaps even 7 doses when using low dead-volume syringes/needles to extract each 0.3 mL (30 mg) dose. The vaccine is administered intramuscularly (IM) as a series of 2 doses 3 weeks apart.

Dilution errors result in administering too much or too little vaccine. If you add too much diluent, doses may be ineffective. If you add too little diluent, doses may include stronger adverse effects (if one happens). In one reported case, mixing the vaccine with too little diluent was suspected when only 0.25 mL remained in the multiple-dose vial when attempting to access the fifth dose. As instructed in the Fact Sheet, the 0.25 mL of remaining vaccine was discarded (rather than pooled with vaccine from other vials). The previous four doses may represent overdoses.

According to a second report, an inadequate volume of diluent (approximately 1 mL) was added to the vaccine vial. Before the error was discovered, a 65-year-old patient received a nearly 2-fold overdose during his first vaccine dose. The patient had no initial reaction to the overdose and was discharged after an hour with follow-up calls planned for the next 48 hours. Clinic staff called a Pfizer representative to determine if the patient's second vaccine dose should be altered, but no immediate guidance was offered.

The third dilution error was similar to the previous error in that only 1 mL, instead of 18 mL of 0.9% sodium chloride injection was used to dilute the vaccine. Again, only one clinic patient received the nearly 2-fold overdose before the error was caught. No details were provided regarding the patient's response to the overdose.

In the last case, which happened internationally, eight healthcare workers in a long-term care (LTC) facility received the entire vial contents (0.45 mL), without dilution, for their first dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine. Four of the eight workers were hospitalized as a

continued on page 2 — Vaccine errors >




Figure 1. Current Pfizer-BioNTech (top) and Moderna (bottom) COVID-19 vaccine vial and carton labels, which could change.





Figure 2. Hefty (top) and Hefty Quadrivalent (bottom) pre-filled syringe look-alike in size and shape, and both are refrigerated, contributing to mix-ups.



<https://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acute-care>


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Problem

— Analysis of recent flu vaccine errors can be used to prepare for COVID-19 vaccine campaigns. Risk factors to consider include:

- look-alike vaccine names, labels, and packaging
- unsegregated refrigerator storage
- mixing errors
- communication barriers
- not checking/documenting administration in the immunization information system (IIS)
- inability to use technologies during mass immunizations
- temperature excursions/expired vaccines



<https://www.ismp.org/newsletters/acute-care>



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Problem

- **Increased demand and coadministration of the vaccines.** Flu season is already a busy vaccination time for community pharmacies. And, with the approval of vaccine booster shots and the surge in COVID-19, vaccinators are stretched even more to accommodate demand. Also, the ability to administer the flu and COVID-19 vaccines during the same visit may be a causative factor.
- **Syringes near each other.** Some vaccinators have picked up a COVID-19 vaccine syringe instead of the flu vaccine syringe, which were right next to each other in the vaccination area. Bringing both vaccines into a patient vaccination area when they are not needed sets the vaccine provider up for a possible mix-up.
- **Unlabeled syringes.** In the US, many vaccine providers purchase the flu vaccine in manufacturer prefilled syringes, which are labeled. But COVID-19 vaccines are available in multiple-dose vials and must be prepared in a syringe for administration to patients. It is possible that these prepared COVID-19 vaccine syringes were not labeled. Also, COVID-19 vaccine doses may be prepared in an unlabeled syringe by one healthcare provider and administered by another; as a result, the person who administers the vaccine may not visually verify the empty vial if it remains with the person who prepared the dose.



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Problem

- **Distractions.** After a vaccine mix-up, one vaccine provider told the patient that he had become distracted by their conversation. Interruptions and other distractions in a busy location (pharmacy in the US) could also lead to mix-ups.
- **Staffing shortages.** Because most healthcare providers are experiencing staffing shortages, it is possible that current vaccine providers are multi-tasking and hurried/rushed, even when patients are scheduled for vaccinations.



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Recommendations

- **Provide staffing support.** Schedule vaccines for a dedicated block of time each day and ensure adequate staffing. Explore the use of qualified and trained volunteers to assist in the vaccination process (as was done initially when the COVID-19 vaccines first became available) to relieve some of the stress associated with professional staffing shortages.
- **Label the syringes.** All individual syringes containing vaccines should be clearly labeled, by the manufacturer if prefilled syringes are used, or by the vaccine dose preparer if single- or multiple-dose vials are used. Be sure to provide vaccine preparers with any necessary labels to affix to the syringes to facilitate proper labeling.
- **Separate the vaccines.** Only bring the intended and labeled vaccine syringe(s) for one patient into the vaccination area.
- **Identify the patient and requested vaccine.** When the patient approaches the pharmacy counter to request a vaccination and immediately prior to vaccination, ask the patient to provide at least two patient identifiers—their full name and date of birth. Access to an electronic patient profile to assist with verifying the patient's identity is recommended.
- Be sure to ask the patient which vaccine(s) they have requested. Talking with the patient about their vaccines ahead of administration can reduce the risk of errors. Be sure to verify the vaccine(s) the patient requests with the patient's signed consent form(s).



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Recommendations

- **Involve the patient/parent in the checking process.** Ask the patient/parent to read the syringe label (and vial if present) to confirm that it is the correct vaccine. Have the patient/parent and the vaccine provider read the label and expiration date aloud. At a minimum, the vaccine provider should tell the patient exactly which vaccine is being given before administration.
- **Document lot number/expiration date.** Document the vaccine lot number and expiration date prior to administration. (The vaccine lot number may signal a mix-up has occurred and prevent it from reaching a patient.) Then document vaccine administration afterward in the patient's profile, on vaccination records, and via state or other immunization registries.
- **Scan the barcode.** During the production and/or pharmacist verification phase of the dispensing process, scan the vaccine barcode to verify that the correct product has been retrieved from the refrigerator or freezer. Ideally, barcode scanning should be available at the point of administration, even in outpatient vaccine clinics, to once again confirm that the correct vaccine had been retrieved and prepared.
- **Provide the intended vaccine.** If a mix-up occurs, apologize to the patient and provide the intended vaccine (since both the flu and COVID-19 vaccines can be given at the same visit), either before they leave the vaccination area or by asking the patient to return to the vaccination site.
- **Report vaccine errors.** Report all vaccine errors internally as well as to the appropriate agency (in the US it is the FDA Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS, <https://vaers.hhs.gov/>), which is mandatory for errors with the COVID-19 vaccines available under an EUA. ISMP also asks providers to report vaccine errors to the **ISMP National Vaccine Errors Reporting Program** (ISMP VERP, www.ismp.org/VERP).



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Potential for adult and pediatric COVID-19 vaccine mix-ups

Adult Pfizer-BioNTech – 30 mcg/0.3 mL; Pediatric Pfizer-BioNTech 10 mcg/0.2 mL



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Wrong Age Errors



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Age-dependent Formulations of the Same Vaccine



<https://www.vaccinestoppe.com>

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Issue: COVID-19 vaccine errors

- Dilution errors leading to under- or overdose of vaccine
- Mixing errors with 2-component vaccines (diluent instead of vaccine or wrong diluent such as sterile water)
- Air injected into vial instead of diluent
- Storage issues (unsegregated vaccine brands in refrigerator)
- Wrong vaccine given for dose 2 (not checking/documenting in immunization information system)
- Administration to wrong age group
- Waste of vaccine and not taking advantage of over-fill in vaccine vials
- Errors in scheduling second dose
- Look-alike vials (vaccine-monovalent antibody mix-up)
- Shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA)



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Correspondence

Avoiding shoulder injury from intramuscular vaccines

With the roll-out of COVID-19 vaccination programmes to tens of millions of people, some individuals might receive vaccines, which have received rigorous safety checks and approval from regulatory bodies, via intramuscular injection. However, the safety around the technique used and the site of injection, in particular, has received little attention. As recommended by the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI), adults aged 16 years or older will be the main population receiving the intramuscular vaccine. The JCVI recommends the deltoid muscle as the optimal injection site, shown graphically as a triangle with the base starting around 1-3 cm below the acromion (apophysis). However, this site is not universally accepted as the most appropriate; other organisations advocate alternative sites, such as a triangular region with the base around 5 cm below the acromion and the apex at the level of the axilla apex (degenerating the middle third of the deltoid muscle), or midway between the acromion and the deltoid tuberosity.^{1,2}

The site closest to the acromion and origin of the deltoid has several anatomical structures within its vicinity, including the posterior circumflex humeral artery, the anterior branch of the axillary nerve (located 5 cm below the acromion lateral border), and the subacromial-subdeltoid bursa.³ The subdeltoid bursa can extend to 4.0 cm below the acromion and 3.0 cm below the axilla. A range of injuries have been reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System database in the USA following vaccination (mostly for influenza); injuries were predominantly shoulder pain and dysfunction (due to pain, joint-range restriction, bursitis, and stiff

shoulder), and patients reported that the vaccines were administered "too high" on the arm.⁴ Spanish pharmacovigilance organisations have similarly reported bursitis and other shoulder injuries following intramuscular vaccination administered in the deltoid.

Antagonometric studies of the optimal site of vaccination have identified that the safest anatomical site in adults of both sexes would be approximately (varying by size and sex) 7-13 cm below the mid-acromion, anatomically midway between the acromion and the deltoid tuberosity (apophysis). This region avoids the anterior branch of the axillary nerve or the subacromial-subdeltoid bursa.⁵ The risk of injury can be further reduced by the recipient placing their hand on the ipsilateral hip (ie, abducting the shoulder to 60°) when receiving the injection. This manoeuvre reduces exposure of the subacromial-subdeltoid bursa to injury. An injection administered at 90° to the skin's surface with a 25 mm needle routinely penetrates at least 5 mm of muscle in men and women.

Updating policy and training vaccinators to safely administer the vaccine in the appropriate intramuscular site will be essential for ensuring efficacy of the vaccine, as placement in a bursa or joint will prevent immune system exposure, and for increasing comfort and reducing pain in vaccine recipients.

¹ ISMP's Vaccination Errors: A Practical Guide to Avoiding Shoulder Injuries. <https://www.ismp.org/press-releases/2021/02/01>

² Public Health England. Immunisation guidelines for the UK. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immunisation-guidelines-for-the-uk>

³ New Zealand Ministry of Health. Vaccine administration in Immunisation Handbook 2020. <https://www.moh.govt.nz/immunisation-handbook/>

⁴ ISMP's Vaccination Errors: A Practical Guide to Avoiding Shoulder Injuries. <https://www.ismp.org/press-releases/2021/02/01>

⁵ ISMP's Vaccination Errors: A Practical Guide to Avoiding Shoulder Injuries. <https://www.ismp.org/press-releases/2021/02/01>

NurseAdviseERR

Educating the Healthcare Community About Safe Medication Practices

Prevent shoulder injuries during intramuscular COVID-19 vaccinations

As our nation begins a large-scale coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) immunization campaign later this year since the deadly virus emerged in the US, it is critically important for healthcare workers who administer the vaccine to understand proper intramuscular (IM) administration technique in order to avoid a preventable and disabling occurrence called shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA). This is especially important right now, as healthcare workers who may not normally administer vaccines may be called upon to help administer the new COVID-19 vaccines.

Case Report

A patient recently reported to ISMP that she went to her local community pharmacy to receive the 2020-2021 FLUBLOK QUADRI-VALENT influenza vaccine as well as SHINGRIX (zoster vaccine recombinant, adjuvanted). When one of the vaccines was administered in her right arm, the patient experienced severe pain, more than previous immunizations she had received. She also described feeling as if the needle had passed straight through her muscle. Later that evening, the pain in her right shoulder, where Shingrix had been administered, intensified. It wasn't until she applied ice to her shoulder that she was finally able to fall asleep. The severe pain had mostly resolved by the next morning.

It has been two months since the patient received these two vaccinations, and she states her right shoulder has not returned to normal. For example, she is not able to reach for things or move her shoulder in certain ways without experiencing pain and discomfort. So, what could this be? SIRVA could be one explanation.

SIRVA

SIRVA is a shoulder injury triggered by the incorrect injection of a vaccine into the shoulder capsule (joint) rather than the deltoid muscle. It is caused by using an incorrect IM injection technique or improper landmarking of the IM injection site (the deltoid muscle) that results in the unintended injection of the vaccine (and/or trauma from the needle) into and around the underlying bursa of the shoulder. This results in an inflammatory process that causes injury to the musculoskeletal structures of the shoulder (ie, tendons, ligaments, bursae).^{1,2}

Symptoms of SIRVA include persistent shoulder pain, weakness, and limited range of motion that typically develop within hours to a few days after receiving a vaccine; these symptoms do not improve with over-the-counter analgesics. The resulting chronic shoulder pain and the inability to carry out daily activities that were possible prior to vaccination

SAFETY wires

1. Administer adenosine rapidly for cardioversion. Adenosine injection is often used to restore normal sinus rhythm in patients with paroxysmal supraventricular tachycardia. To be effective, doses must be administered as a rapid intravenous (IV) bolus injection over 1 to 2 seconds. It is typically given via a peripheral venous access site as close to the patient's torso as possible. In addition, adenosine must be immediately followed by a rapid 50% sodium chloride flush. Experienced nurses often attach the adenosine syringe and sodium chloride flush syringe to a Y-site stopcock to expedite administration.

Such a rapid sequence of injections is unlike many other medications administered via IV push. This is due to the drug's very short half-life (less than 10 seconds) and the need to carry the drug to the heart as quickly as possible before rapid metabolism inactivates it. Manufacturer syringe and vial labels mention that the drug is intended for rapid IV use; however, some practitioners may be unaware of this fact. We recently received a report in which adenosine injection was administered too slowly during an attempted cardiac life support (ACLS) event, resulting in a failure to convert the patient to normal sinus rhythm.

Retrieval of adenosine from an automated dispensing cabinet (ADC) is often accomplished via override (eg, during a code), so many safeguards built into orders may not appear on the medication administration record (MAR). Thus, an auxiliary label affixed to adenosine, reminding staff to administer the drug via rapid IV push, may be an important reminder. Prescribers can also remind staff to give adenosine by rapid IV push when giving verbal orders during an emergency. Staff, especially those stationed in the emergency department or

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Preventing errors with COVID-19 vaccines

- Verify competency of preparers and vaccinators (many are volunteers)
- Dispense pharmacy prepared and labeled syringes when possible, or one person prepares and administers
- For mass vaccination, utilize a standard, organized process with independent double checks
- Maximize doses withdrawn from vials
- Identify/differentiate monoclonal antibodies from vaccines

- Separate vaccines in storage
- Plan for leftover vaccine
- Be prepared for allergic reactions
- Report vaccine errors and adverse reactions (US requires reporting to VAERS); additional reporting to ISMP is voluntary
- Utilize immunization information systems

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
Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Extemporaneously Prepared Syringes

- Often not labeled and can result in errors
- Preparation should involve bar code scanning and labeling process.
- Independent double check
- Vial accompanying labelled syringe
- Use manufacturer-supplied prefilled syringes



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


<https://www.usp.org/covid-19/vaccine-handling-toolkit>



<https://www.ismp.org/covid-19-resources>

? What does Low Dead Volume look like?
LDV syringe and needle features compared (the figures below represent dead volume in syringes)




<https://www.ashp.org/-/media/assets/pharmacy-practice/resource-centers/Coronavirus/docs/FAQ-optimizing-covid-vaccine-prep-safety.ashx>

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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors



https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/948294_print

www.medscape.com

COMMENTARY

Common COVID Vaccine Administration Errors to Watch For

Sarah F. Schillie, MD, MPH, MBA, Jennifer Buzzell, MS, Christina A. Nelson, MD, MPH, Sarah Kidd, MD, MPH, Katherine R. Shealy, MPH, Sarah Reagan-Steiner, MD, MPH

April 09, 2021

In December 2020, the US Food and Drug Administration approved Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines. As of March 20, 2021, more than 120 million COVID-19 vaccine doses have been administered to people in the United States. As we work toward expanding COVID-19 vaccination further, however, we must take care to minimize errors in vaccine administration.

Proper vaccine administration is necessary to ensure vaccine effectiveness, achieve optimal vaccine-induced protection, avoid safety implications, and assure confidence in the COVID-19 vaccination program. Since the launch of vaccination efforts on December 14, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has received more than 300 inquiries through the CDC inquiry response services (eg, CDC-INFO, NIP-INFO) seeking guidance for managing an mRNA COVID-19 vaccine administration error that had occurred.


The most common error type described in inquiries (Table), representing more than one third of inquiries, was administration of a lower-than-authorized dose (eg, the needle disconnecting from the syringe, resulting in vaccine spillage). Other frequent error types queried included administration to someone younger than the authorized age (18.5% of inquiries) and administration by a route other than intramuscular (IM) (12.3% of inquiries).

These inquiries probably underestimate the actual number of COVID-19 vaccine administration errors and might not capture all inquiries CDC received.

Table. COVID-19 Vaccine Administration Error Inquiries Received by CDC, December 14, 2020, to February 28, 2021


Error type	Example	Number (%) of topics across inquiries received (N = 324) ^a
Administration by the incorrect route	Subcutaneous administration	40 (12.3%)
Administration at an incorrect anatomic site	Administration into shoulder bursa; administration in the gluteal muscle of the buttock	33 (10.2%)
Higher-than-authorized dose volume administered	Administration of undiluted vaccine	11 (3.4%)
Lower-than-authorized dose volume administered	Dose leaked out of syringe; recipient pulled away and dose leaked out	114 (35.2%)
Administration to someone younger than the authorized age	Administration to person aged < 16 years (Pfizer-BioNTech) or < 18 years (Moderna)	60 (18.5%)
Administration of a mixed-product series	First and second doses from different manufacturer	16 (4.9%)
Administration of a second dose earlier than the 4-day grace period	Second dose administered < 17 days (Pfizer-BioNTech) or < 24 days (Moderna) after the first dose	21 (6.5%)
Dose administered after improper storage and handling	Temperature excursion; more than allowed time after first vial puncture; use after beyond use date	15 (4.6%)
Other	Incorrect diluent; incorrect needle length; expired syringe	14 (4.3%)

^aSome inquiries represent errors affecting more than one vaccine recipient (eg, at a mass vaccination clinic).



https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/948294_print

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<https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/downloads/covid19-vaccine-errors-deviations.pdf>

www.medscape.com

COMMENTARY

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<https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/downloads/covid19-vaccine-errors-deviations.pdf>

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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Failure to Check Immunization Information Systems

- Immunization Information Systems (IIS)¹
 - Available in all 50 states
 - Managed by individual states
- No national organization that maintains vaccination records.²



1. IAC. State information: Direct links to state immunization websites. 2019. Available at: <http://www.immunize.org/states/>
2. CDC. Vaccine information for Adults: How to locate your vaccination record. 2016. Available at: <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/adults/vaccination-records.html>

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
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Non-Standard Expiration Date Expression

December 13, 2012
or
December 12, 2013?




June 19, 2018
or
June 18, 2019?




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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors



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General Chapter <7> Labeling

CHANGE TO EXPIRATION DATE FORMAT

July 31, 2020

On July 31, 2020, USP published revisions to [General Chapter <7> Labeling](#). To better address concerns such as patient safety and alignment with international expiration date formats, the standard calls for a 4-digit year format at the beginning of the expiration date. Options for month and day formats as part of the expiration date also are presented. This standard has implications for labels on all drug and dietary supplement products that comply with USP standards. The revisions were proposed and approved following USP's routine revision process, with a public comment period from November 1, 2019 to January 31, 2020. In light of the broad implications of this standard and to address potential implementation concerns, the new requirements have been given an extended official date of September 1, 2023.

The expiration date format was modified based on several considerations, including the following:

Patient Safety Challenges¹

The Nomenclature and Labeling Expert Committee (NLEC) evaluated patient safety data and concerns related to expiration date formats. Examples included the following:

- Difficulty determining if the numbers represent a lot number or expiration date.
- Confusion with 2-digit year formats. Example: 20MAR21 can be interpreted as March 20, 2021 or March 21, 2020.
 - Formats that included a 2-digit year were more easily confused with a day.
- Misinterpretation of 2-letter months. Example: MA – March or May; or JU – June or July.
- All-numeric (6-digit) formats without a hyphen or forward slash separating the 2-digit year, month, and day can be misinterpreted depending on the digits used. Example: 201222 can be interpreted as December 20, 2022, December 22, 2020, or a lot number.
- Multiple variations in the order of year, month, and day, which can lead to difficulty in the interpretation of expiration dates.

To address patient safety concerns, the NLEC agreed upon the following expiration date format changes:

- A consistent format of year, month, and day to help prevent confusion between month and day.
- A 4-digit year format to help healthcare workers, patients, and consumers distinguish between the year and the day.
- The use of 3 letters for the month in alphanumeric formats to help minimize misinterpretations.
- The use of hyphens or forward slashes to help improve readability when used to separate the year, month, and day.

¹ Institute for Safe Medication Practices, National Medication Error Reporting Program

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Acute Care

ISMP Medication Safety Alert!

Educating the Healthcare Community About Safe Medication Practices

Administration of concentrated potassium chloride for injection during a code: Still deadly!

PRECEDENCE: Decades ago, ISMP became aware of multiple patient injuries and fatalities associated with the accidental intravenous (IV) administration of concentrated potassium chloride for injection prior to dilution. Back then, it was common to find potassium chloride vials on nursing units in US hospitals, and the occasional mix-ups due to look-alike medication vials or mental slips led to disastrous outcomes. By 1981, ISMP had already convened a national meeting that helped influence USP and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to require vials of concentrated potassium chloride for injection to have black caps and closures as well as warning statements to prevent mix-ups with other parenteral drugs. Nevertheless, potassium chloride vials remained on nursing units, and unsafe practices, such as not labeling syringes of potassium chloride intended for IV admixture preparation, continued to contribute to fatalities.

In 1995, ISMP sent a nationwide mailing to US hospitals that strongly recommended the removal of vials of concentrated potassium chloride for injection from patient care areas. Three years later, in the very first Sentinel Event Alert (www.ismp.org/SEAlert), The Joint Commission (TJC) asked hospitals to consider ISMP's recommendation to not allow the vials outside of the pharmacy. By 2003, TJC required hospitals to remove concentrated potassium chloride and other concentrated electrolytes from all patient care units outside of the pharmacy in its Inaugural National Patient Safety Goals. Since then, ISMP has been aware of only one case of accidental IV push of concentrated potassium chloride in the US in 2007 in a non-Joint Commission accredited hospital—until now.

ISMP recently received a report of an error in which concentrated potassium chloride was administered IV push to a patient during a cardiac arrest code. In this hospital, concentrated potassium chloride vials were only stocked in the pharmacy, not on patient care units. Hands down, this is the most effective safeguard to prevent inadvertent IV administration of undiluted potassium chloride. Still, the event happened when a clinical pharmacist called the central pharmacy to ask staff to bring a vial of concentrated potassium chloride to a code he was attending. Through a series of miscommunications and incorrect assumptions, the drug was administered undiluted to the patient.

The Event

A 70-year-old intensive care unit (ICU) patient in isolation with a contagious infectious disease (not coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19]) experienced a cardiac arrest. To prevent unnecessary staff exposure to the infectious disease, the code was not announced overhead hospital-wide but only in the ICU. This resulted in a small team responding to the code—an experienced ICU intensivist, an experienced ICU pharmacist, and a nurse fellow and his preceptor (an experienced ICU nurse). In this hospital, the nursing fellowship program offered licensed nurses with some generalized experience the professional development necessary to become successful in a specialty field—in this case, ICU nursing.

During the code, the ICU intensivist verbally requested “potassium chloride 20 mEq IV.” The pharmacist, who was pulling and preparing the requested medications, assumed that the intensivist did not want to administer an infusion, which would have required an hour to administer. Instead, the pharmacist thought the intensivist had purposely

continued on page 2 — Potassium chloride >

SAFETY briefs

Adrenalin vials look similar to COVID-19 vaccine vials. It has been called to our attention that EPINEPHRINE (ADRENALIN) vials from Par Pharmaceutical look similar to the BioNTech coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccine vials. Both are about the same size and shape, with purple caps and mostly black print on white labels (Figure 1). A Safety Brief in our April 2021 newsletter discussed two cases that occurred at a vaccination site where EPINEPHRINE syringes were accidentally administered to patients instead of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine, shedding light on the importance of ensuring separate storage of EPINEPHRINE and COVID-19 vaccine syringes. It should not be difficult to see how the same mix-up could happen with these similar-looking vials.



Figure 1. Similar looking vials of Par Pharmaceutical Adrenalin (left) and the BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine (right).

Certainly, EPINEPHRINE must be readily available to treat a rare anaphylactic reaction associated with the COVID-19 vaccines. However, avoid storing these vials near COVID-19 vaccines. If possible, consider utilizing barcode technology that requires scanning the EPINEPHRINE vials prior to administration (despite the fast-paced environment during

continued on page 2 — SAFETY briefs >

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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Conjugate Antigen versus Target Vaccine Name



A **conjugate vaccine** is a substance that is composed of a polysaccharide antigen fused (**conjugated**) to a carrier molecule. This enhances the stability and the effectiveness of the **vaccine**.



<http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20110422/NY88254>
<https://mms.mckesson.com>

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Unfamiliarity with Mixing and Preparing 2 Component Vaccines



<https://www.gskdirect.com>

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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Packaging Issue- RotaTeq vs. Rotarix

- Rotarix injected instead of given orally



Figure 1. Merck product, RotaTeq, is available as a liquid in a squeeze applicator.



Figure 2. Rotarix oral applicator with diluent for reconstitution. The reconstituted vaccine is redrawn into the applicator.



RotaTeq diluent in between other GSK vaccines that ARE injected



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Pentacel



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Two Chamber Vial Used for Medications with Diluents

Lyophilized powder or vaccine component A




Liquid diluent or vaccine component B



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Human error in vaccine preparation led to the deaths of two children in Samoa after MMR shot – MMR vaccine itself is safe and effective



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors




15 Syrian children die after measles vaccinations

At least 15 children died after receiving measles vaccinations in rebel-held parts of northeastern Syria, while the death toll from two days of government airstrikes on a central city climbed to nearly 300, a heavy toll even by the vicious standards of the country's civil war, activists said.

The children, some just babies, all exhibited signs of "severe allergic shock" about an hour after they were given a second round of measles vaccinations in ISH province on Tuesday, with many succumbing to death as their bodies swelled, said physician Abdullah Agi, who administered the vaccinations in a medical center in the town of Idlib.



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Look-alike vials



ISMP Medication Safety Alert

Avoiding inadvertent IV injection of oral liquids

Insulin pen misuse by patients. When you turn the dose selector to a dose of insulin using a NOVOLING FLEXPEN (Novo Nordisk), the number of units that will be administered appears in a clear window. For example, in Figure 1, the dose that has been dialed is 4 units. We recently received an interesting report from a registered nurse (RN) [Certified Diabetes Educator (CDE)] about a patient who suffered an overdose by misreading the amount dialed. The patient arrived at a hospital emergency department unconscious with a blood sugar of 20 mg/dL. She was treated and later questioned to understand how the dose had been dialed incorrectly using the NovoLIN FLEXPEN. She demonstrated how she dialed the dose by reading the numbers to the right of the dosing window, not within the window. She thought she was giving herself 8 units when she actually was giving herself 40 units. This is the first and only report we've received like this, but we thought we would make readers aware of this one double-check their patients are reading the dose in the right location on the pen device. Incidentally, the CDE cited other problems we hadn't heard before either, such as patients inserting the needle but not pushing the push-button to release the insulin injection, or instead of pushing the push-button they turned the dial, expecting that action would lead to the release of insulin.

Diluent vial looks like drug vial. When powdered or lyophilized drugs require dilution and are packaged with a diluent that isn't clearly labeled, there is the danger that only the diluent may be used. One of the patients has been a recurring problem with products that have been a recurring problem with products.



Generic methylergonovine and Engerix-B mix-ups due to look-alike vials

Novartis Pharmaceuticals sent a letter dated July 2012 to hospitals that highlighted the accidental administration of METHYLERGONOVIN (methylergonovine maleate) to newborns instead of hepatitis B injection. Novartis stopped selling Methergine in February 2012 but issued the letter since the company holds the application for the only brand drug product. The letter also mentioned a mix-up between vitamin K and Methergine; however, the mix-up involved oral liquid formulations which are available in Italy. An oral liquid Methergine formulation is not available in the US. Novartis also reported that it had changed the product labeling for Methergine to look like information about medication errors, which will be required for the product labeling of generic products in the future.

The brand product Methergine injection used to be packaged in an ampul within an amber blister that looked quite different than vials of generic methylergonovine. Now, the generic products are being used exclusively because the brand product Methergine is no longer available.



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Recommendations

- Educate staff about the differences between Shingrix and Zostavax.
- Store the Shingrix lyophilized component and adjuvant suspension together to reduce the risk of using the wrong diluent.

Key Differences	Zostavax	Shingrix
Vaccine Type	Live attenuated	Inactivate recombinant adjuvated
Age recommendation	60 years or older	50 years or older
Vaccine Schedule	1 dose, 0.65 mL	2 doses, 0.5 mL @ 0, 2-6 months
Administration Route	Subcutaneous	Intramuscular
Storage	Frozen, reconstituted	Refrigerated, reconstituted



<https://theabofpharmacsites.wordpress.com/2017/12/08/shots-for-the-new-year/>

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Name or Abbreviation Confusion

- DTaP-Tdap
- Adacel (Tdap) - Daptacel (DTaP)
- Kinrix (DTaP/Polio) –Pediarix (DTaP/Polio/hepatitis B)
- HepB (virus) – Hib
- Hib -HBV
- HPV – HBV
- Varicella virus live vaccine – varicella zoster immune globulin (VZIG)
- Varivax – Zostavax



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Position of Proper Name on Biologicals


- 1968 - 33 Fed. Reg. 367 (Jan. 10, 1968). "The proper name of the product on the package label shall be placed above any trade-mark or trade name identifying the product and symmetrically arranged with respect other printing on the label." 33 Fed. Reg. at 369.
- Inconsistent with all other drugs
- Patient safety issue with combination products



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Chain Pharmacy



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Insulin instead of influenza vaccine: Drug and vaccine storage

- October 2014 - St. Louis County Missouri occurred where five teachers received insulin instead of influenza vaccine (<http://www.kctv5.com/story/26724632/teachers-seeking-flu-shots-instead-given-insulin>).
- In January 2010 in Wellesley, Massachusetts staffers at a school there received insulin instead of influenza vaccine (<http://www.flushots4u.com/press/article/61/How-Did-School-Staffers-Get-Insulin-Instead-of-Flu-Vaccine>).
- In 2007 case where a teacher in nearby Attleboro received insulin instead of flu vaccine.
- In November 2009 in Holland, 11 elderly residents in a nursing home received insulin instead of influenza vaccine (<http://www.diabetesdaily.com/forum/diabetes-news/34510-insulin-instead-mexican-flu-shot>).
- In another case, also in Holland, a patient died after insulin was given instead of influenza vaccine. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/11/pensioner_dies_after_wrong_inj.php.
- In 2008 in Bedford County Virginia, five school employees went to the hospital after the school nurse accidentally gave insulin instead of the flu shot. http://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/bedford-school-employees-mistakenly-get-insulin-not-flu-vaccine/article_622f43da-189b-563d-b01d-1ce8f679a5db.html?mode=jgm
- May 5, 2016. Fifty hospital employees given insulin instead of influenza vaccine. <https://www.ismp.org/resources/fifty-hospital-employees-given-insulin-instead-influenza-vaccine>.
- November 2019. Oklahoma pharmacist accidentally gives 10 people insulin instead of flu shot. <https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/quality/oklahoma-pharmacist-accidentally-gives-10-people-insulin-instead-of-flu-shot.html>
- Four newborns died in Iraq after insulin given instead of hepatitis B vaccine (via chat function webinar for Uppsala Monitoring Center, October 21, 2020)



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Process for Administering Vaccines



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Pharmacy Risk Assessments – Coming Soon

Updated

ISMP Medication Safety Self Assessment®

Community/Ambulatory Pharmacy

New


ISMP Medication Safety Self Assessment®

Specialty Pharmacy

Not Implemented

Partially Implemented

Fully Implemented



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Assessment Dashboard – Sample

Assessment: Medication Safety Assessm...
Group: Null
Health System: Null
Region: Null
Facility: Null
Sentiment Sort: % Positive
Response Year: (All)
Assessment Date: (All)

Total Comments: 20

ECRI Aggregate % Positive 81.2%

Selected Entity % Positive 81.2%

Participation Rate 206.7%

KEY AREA SENTIMENT AND AGGREGATE COMPARISON


Area	% Positive
Computerized Physician O...	88.8%
High Risk/High Alert Medi...	88.7%
Safe and Secure Environm...	86.5%
Equipment Safety and Up...	85.5%
Leadership and Accountab...	85.1%
Medication Processes	83.8%
Communication and Infor...	77.6%
Patient Information and E...	77.2%
Pharmacy Policies	76.6%
Medication Error Preventi...	71.0%
Staff Competency and Edu...	60.3%

% POSITIVE BY FACILITY

81.2%

% POSITIVE BY JOB FUNCTION

Frontline Pharmacy (Phar...	85.7%
Manager Clinical (Pharma...	83.5%
Frontline Clinical (Registe...	79.1%
Frontline Non-Clinical (Hu...	0.0%
Frontline Physician (Physi...	0.0%
Leader Non-Physician (Ris...	0.0%
Leader Physician (Chief M...	0.0%
Manager Non-Clinical (Bio...	0.0%



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Important Actions Community Pharmacies Need To Take Now To Reduce Potentially Harmful Dispensing Errors

Medication Safety Intensive (MSI) Workshops

Next Workshop: December 2-3, 2021

- 2-day virtual workshop
- 12.5 CE credit hours for nurses and pharmacists
- Pharmacists, nurses, physicians, risk managers, academicians



<https://www.ismp.org/education/msi-workshops>

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Questions?

This activity is supported by **Novartis, Name Creation and Regulatory Strategy.**

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