Measuring medication safety:
What works? What doesn't?
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From the Aug 11, 1999 issue
By itself, data from hospital incident reports provides an
inaccurate and meaningless way to measure the effectiveness
and safety of medication use. Research has confirmed that
many medication errors go undetected, including those that
cause patient harm. Even when detected, errors may not be
reported. Practitioners may fail to report errors that have
been intercepted before reaching the patient unless the organization
clearly defines and communicates all situations that should
be reported. Once reported, practitioners may not continue
to report similar errors, believing they have adequately informed
leadership of the problem. Moreover, failures to remedy reported
problems, insufficient feedback about actions taken to prevent
further occurrence, complex and time-consuming reporting systems,
and fear of personal and professional consequences also inhibit
reporting. In fact, focus on error rates derived from spontaneous
reporting systems often places undo pressure on practitioners
to report fewer errors. However, there are more reliable methods
that organizations can employ to measure the safety of medication
use and the effectiveness of error prevention strategies.
An understanding that medication safety can be vastly improved
by reducing the potential for adverse drug events is key to
meaningful measurement of medication use and effective error
prevention efforts. While errors that result in serious patient
harm occur occasionally, the potential for these catastrophic
events frequently lurks in many organizations. As such, measuring
potential adverse drug events (PADEs) along with adverse drug
events (ADEs) which cause patient harm (minor and serious),
provides more meaningful and accurate data upon which organizations
can act to prevent errors and show improvement in medication
safety. Additionally, error prevention efforts are more effective
when measurement is focused on specific high alert drugs or
error-prone situations.
For example, PADEs with chemotherapy can be measured
by determining the incidence of unsafe order communication
(abbreviations; prescribing course doses instead of single
doses; failure to indicate mg/m2 dose; failure to round doses
over 10 mg, etc.); percent of orders that exceed maximum safe
doses during order review; failure to communicate rationale
for dose alterations when prescribing; and the availability
of current laboratory values (CBC, Cr, etc.), height, weight,
BSA and age on order forms. PADEs with administration of drugs
to which patients are allergic can be measured by reviewing
daily computer reports to determine the incidence of patient
profiles without allergy information and the percentage of
orders that require intervention to prevent administration
of drugs to which patients are allergic. Likewise, reviewing
the use of drugs that may indicate an allergic response (e.g.
diphenhydramine, corticosteroids) can enhance ADE detection.
PADEs with heparin use can be measured by determining
the incidence of patients who have not reached therapeutic
range within 24 hours of therapy; the incidence of aPTTs over
100 for all patients on heparin; the mean number of aPTTs
daily per patient receiving IV heparin; and adherence to heparin
protocols. ADEs can be measured by determining the incidence
of significant bleeding, administration of PRBC's, or use
of protamine.
Continued measurement and visual display of data for PADEs
and ADEs together on one chart, with notation at points where
various system-based changes have occurred, can clearly demonstrate
the effectiveness of error prevention strategies. While spontaneous
reports of potential and actual errors can be useful to augment
measurement, their solo use in determining a rate is only
meaningful when used to demonstrate an increase or decrease
in the error reporting rate.
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